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Abstract
Background: Mental disorders are highly comorbid: people having one disorder are likely to have another as well. We
explain empirical comorbidity patterns based on a network model of psychiatric symptoms, derived from an analysis of
symptom overlap in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV).
Principal Findings: We show that a) half of the symptoms in the DSM-IV network are connected, b) the architecture of these
connections conforms to a small world structure, featuring a high degree of clustering but a short average path length, and
c) distances between disorders in this structure predict empirical comorbidity rates. Network simulations of Major
Depressive Episode and Generalized Anxiety Disorder show that the model faithfully reproduces empirical population
statistics for these disorders.
Conclusions: In the network model, mental disorders are inherently complex. This explains the limited successes of genetic,
neuroscientific, and etiological approaches to unravel their causes. We outline a psychosystems approach to investigate the
structure and dynamics of mental disorders.
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Introduction
One of the major discoveries in the past century of
psychopathology research is that comorbidity (the joint occurrence
of two or more mental disorders) is the rule rather than the
exception [1]. Since comorbidity has consistently been associated
with a poorer prognosis and greater demands for professional help,
unraveling the causes of comorbidity ranks among the top
priorities in clinical psychology and psychiatry [2,3].
In practice, comorbidity is often investigated by analyzing the
association between composite measures defined on two sets of
items (i.e., a correlation between total scores on checklists) or
between two diagnoses. This methodology has yielded important
insights into which disorders co-occur more frequently than
chance [1,4,5] and into risk factors that predispose towards
comorbidity [6–8].
However, a limitation of this methodology is that symptoms are
viewed as passive indicators of ‘‘latent’’ conditions (disorders) that
do the actual causal work [9,10]. Comorbidity is then suggested to
arise from a root cause that is shared by two or more latent
disorders. For instance, shared genes or a general predisposition
towards negative affect have been put forward as common causes
of comorbidity between Major Depressive Episode (MDE) and
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD; [11,12]).
In clinical psychology and psychiatry, however, symptoms are
unlikely to be merely passive psychometric indicators of latent
conditions; rather, they indicate properties with autonomous causal
relevance. That is, when symptoms arise, they can cause other
symptoms on their own. For instance, among the symptoms of
MDE we find sleep deprivation and concentration problems, while GAD
comprises irritability and fatigue [13]. It is feasible that comorbidity
between MDE and GAD arises from causal chains of directly
related symptoms; e.g., sleep deprivation (MDE)Rfatigue (MDE)Rcon-
centrationproblems(GAD)Rirritability(GAD).Forotherdisorders,such
chains appear plausible as well: e.g., having suffered from a panic attack
(panic disorder)Rbeing worried about having another attack (panic
disorder)Ravoiding public places (agoraphobia). In accordance with
this idea, Kim and Ahn [14] showed that clinical psychologists
typically interpret symptom patterns in terms of causal networks.
Thus, it is likely that direct relations between symptoms exist. As
a result, there may be individual differences in how comorbid
disorders develop. There may not just be one source of
comorbidity, for which it does not matter which symptoms are
in effect for a given person; there may instead be many roads to
comorbidity, and which one is taken depends on the person and
his or her specific situation. Figure 1 shows an illustration of this
idea, by highlighting possible roads to comorbidity between MDE
and GAD for two fictitious persons, Alice and Bob. In both, MDE
leads to GAD, but in different ways and for different reasons. For
instance, Alice may develop depressed feelings due to the break-up
of a romantic relationship, while Bob may become overweight
after losing his job (see Figure 1). Such differences are plausible,
because the onset of symptoms of mental disorders like MDE is
differentially related to distinct life events [15]. In addition, the
events that set the domino effect in motion may affect the
subsequent road that is taken to comorbidity (Figure 1: Alice and
Bob travel different roads but both end up with a MDE and GAD
diagnosis).
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network approach to mental disorders and comorbidity [16]. In this
approach, symptoms are not viewed as indicators of latent
conditions, but as components in a network; comorbidity is
hypothesized to result from direct relations between symptoms of
multiple disorders. Here, we use this approach to analyze the
entire symptom space described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV; [13]). We construct a
network of this space and show that (a) half of the symptoms in the
DSM-IV are directly or indirectly connected in a so-called giant
component, and (b) this component of connected symptoms has the
characteristics of a small world [17]. This means that a significant
part of DSM-IV comorbidity may indeed arise through the effects
of symptoms shared by multiple disorders (i.e., bridge symptoms;
[16]). In addition, we show through simulations that the network
model can account for population statistics on prevalence and
comorbidity.
Results
Study 1: Construction and analysis of the DSM-IV-
network
A first step towards providing an account of comorbidity from a
network perspective is to examine the most often used taxonomy
of mental disorders, as represented in the DSM-IV. More
specifically, to get a first approximation of the symptom space,
we aim to construct a network that represents all individual DSM-
IV symptoms and connections between them. Subsequently, we
analyze its global structure by the application of network analysis
techniques [18].
Graph construction. The DSM-IV lists 201 distinct mental
disorders, which are diagnosed through 522 criteria. Diagnostic
criteria do not map onto symptoms uniquely. Sometimes the same
symptoms function as criteria for distinct disorders (e.g., fatigue is a
symptom of MDE and of GAD), sometimes one symptom is a
special case of another symptom (e.g., insomnia is a special case of
sleep disturbance), and sometimes two symptoms only differ with
respect to their antecedent causes (e.g., insomnia versus insomnia due
to alcohol withdrawal). We dealt with this overlap by a) equating
symptoms that are literally the same or that are so similar that they
are unlikely to be behaviorally distinguishable (e.g., restlessness in
GAD and psychomotor agitation in MDE), b) discounting symptoms
that refer to external influences (e.g., when insomnia is already
present, insomnia due to alcohol withdrawal is not represented as a
distinct symptom), and c) separating disjunctive symptoms into
their constituent parts (e.g., insomnia or hypersomnia, a criterion for
MDE, is decomposed into insomnia and hypersomnia). The resulting
439 symptoms were used for further analysis.
As a result of this methodology, disorders that feature exactly
the same symptoms (e.g., Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode
Hypomanic versus Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Manic) are no
longer represented as distinct entities. The same holds for
disorders that only differ by reference to external precipitating
factors (Delirium Due to a General Medical Condition versus Substance
Withdrawal Delirium). As a result, the number of explicitly
represented disorders in the final analysis (148) is smaller than
Figure 1. The difference between the existing view on comorbidity (top) versus the network approach (bottom) for two fictitious
persons, Alice (left) and Bob (right). In both figures, the red node represents an external life event; green nodes core MDE symptoms; turquoise
nodes core GAD symptoms; purple nodes bridge symptoms (i.e., symptoms that are part of both MDE and GAD). Edges between nodes represent
pathways between symptoms. The light green edges represent possible pathways; the thicker and dark green edges the pathways taken by Alice and
Bob respectively. roma=break-up of romantic relationship; jobl=job loss; mWei=weight problems; mInt=loss of interest; mRep=self-reproach;
mDep=depressed mood; mSui=(thoughts of) suicide; bSle=sleep problems; bFat=fatigue; bCon=concentration problems; bMot=psychomotor
problems; gAnx=chronic anxiety; gEve=anxiety about more than one event; gCtr=no control over anxiety; gMus=muscle tension; gIrr=irritable.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.g001
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cation to disorders are available from http://www.psychosystems.
org/materials.html.
The network was constructed as follows. First, we represent
each of the DSM-IV-symptoms as a node. Second, we draw a
connection (i.e., an edge) between any two symptoms if they
function as criteria for the same disorder. These two steps define a
network structure among the symptoms. Technically this may be
viewed as a projection of a bipartite network, in which symptoms
are connected via common disorders, onto the symptom space. In
the resulting network structure, symptoms of the same disorder
become directly connected, while indirect connections arise
because of the presence of shared symptoms (i.e., bridge
symptoms). For instance, insomnia and lack of interest are directly
connected, because both are symptoms of MDE. Lack of interest and
anxiety, in contrast, are not directly connected (because there are no
DSM-IV disorders that feature both of these symptoms). However,
these symptoms are connected indirectly via insomnia, because
insomnia is a shared symptom of MDE (which also has lack of interest
among its symptoms) and GAD (which includes anxiety among its
symptoms). Finally, two symptoms are unconnected if there is no
way of getting from one to the other via bridge symptoms. To
visualize this network structure, we employed a node positioning
algorithm with the R-package igraph [19] which leads more
strongly connected sets of nodes to cluster closer together [20].
Network analysis. Figure 2 shows the resulting DSM-IV
symptom graph (to identify individual symptoms as well as the
symptom-disorder correspondence, consult http://www.
psychosystems.org/Data/Pics/Graphs/DSMgraph.svg with a
browser that can show .svg files, such as Firefox). The graph has
two properties that are interesting in view of the generally high
comorbidity between DSM-IV diagnoses. First, it features a giant
component spanning 208 (47.4%) of the symptoms: roughly half of
the symptoms are connected. This means that one can reach any
of these symptoms from any other, by traveling along a path
consisting of one or more edges between them. Second, the
structure of the giant component conforms to a small world [17].
This means that, compared to a graph in which the same number
of nodes (208) is connected by same number of edges (1949) in a
completely random fashion (a random graph) it has a similar short
path length between symptoms, but a much higher probability of
an edge between two symptoms that are direct neighbors of a third
symptom, i.e., a higher level of clustering. Table 1 gives an
overview of the characteristics of the giant component in the
DSM-IV network.
To establish the small world property, we examined the
clustering coefficient and average shortest path length of the
DSM-IV graph. The clustering coefficient, based on transitivity, is
defined as 3 times the number of triangles divided by the number
of paths of length 2 [21]. The shortest path length ,(i,j) between
two nodes i and j equals the minimum number of edges that must
be passed over to get from i to j. The average shortest path length
L is the average over the shortest path lengths ,(i,j) of all node
pairs [22]. With a clustering coefficient of CDSM=0.68 and an
average shortest path length of LDSM=2.6 (as opposed to the
expected values of CRND=0.09 and LRND=2.12 in a random
graph; [22]), the giant component of the DSM-IV network has a
small-world-ness index (SWI=(CDSM/CRND)/(LDSM/LRND);
[21]) of 6.2, which exceeds the conservative small-world-ness
criterion threshold of 3 [21]. Figure 3 shows the density of the
SWIs of 10000 random networks (in black), along with the
observed SWI of the giant component (red line). The assortation of
symptoms and disorders that underlies the giant component differs
from a random assortation schedule with respect to small-world-
ness in the resulting symptom networks. To test this, we
determined the SWIs of 10000 networks, in which 208 symptoms
were assorted randomly with the 69 disorders in the giant
component, while each symptom and each disorder had exactly
the same number of connections as in the giant component
(henceforth: permutation model).
Figure 3 shows the density of the SWIs of the simulated
permutation model networks (in blue), which is located in between,
and is well separated from, the density of the random network
SWI’s and the SWI of the DSM giant component. In addition, the
Figure 2. The DSM-IV symptom space. Symptoms are represented as nodes and connected by an edge whenever they figure in the same
disorder. Color of nodes represents the DSM-IV chapter in which they occur most often.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.g002
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larger in these networks (0.15,p,0.17) than in the DSM giant
component (p=0.09). This shows that in the DSM giant
component, symptom groups figure together in multiple disorders
more often than expected under a random assortation schedule.
This is exactly what we would expect if symptom groups are
causally related. In sum, the existent giant component, and its
small world characteristic, reflect that half of the symptoms are
indeed connected, and that the paths to comorbidity arising from
these connections are typically short, with symptom groups
figuring together in multiple disorders.
An important property of nodes in any network is their
centrality [18]. Two of the standard ways of measuring this
property are by determining the degree and betweenness of nodes. The
Table 1. Properties of the DSM-IV giant component.
Global properties
Number of symptoms 208
Number of explicitly represented disorders 69
Number of edges 1949
Average shortest path length 2.60
Average number of shortest paths between two symptoms 3.01
Small-worldness index (SWI), based on transitivity 6.20
Clustering coefficient, based on transitivity 0.68
Average degree 18.74
Symptoms with highest degrees
Symptom name Degree % Connected symptoms
1. Insomnia 71 34.1%
2. Psychomotor agitation 68 32.7%
3. Psychomotor retardation 61 29.3%
4. Depressed 60 28.8%
Symptoms with highest random walk betweenness
Symptom name Betweenness % Connected symptoms
1. Irritable 0.24 23.6%
2. Distracted 0.17 24.0%
3. Anxious 0.16 23.1%
4. Depressed 0.16 28.8%
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.t001
Figure 3. Small-world-ness indices (SWI). Density distributions of the SWI’s of 10000 random networks (in black), and of 10000 permutation
model networks (in blue). The vertical red line marks the observed SWI of the giant component. Dotted vertical lines indicate the respective mean
SWI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.g003
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other nodes. Nodes with a higher degree thus are more central in
the sense of having more direct connections. The degree distribution
(i.e., the probability that a node selected at random has a certain
degree) of a network gives important information about network
structure and is often used in network analysis to classify networks
[23]. The degree distribution of the DSM-network follows an
exponential decay function (top right Figure 4) rather than a
power law (bottom left Figure 4), which classifies it as a single-scale
network [23]. This means that the DSM-IV network is of the same
type as, for instance, an air-traffic network with airports (nodes)
that are connected to small to large numbers of other nodes, yet
without nodes that are connected to extremely large numbers of
other nodes [23]. Similarly, the four most highly connected
symptoms of the DSM-IV network are linked to 60 to 71 other
symptoms (i.e., 14–16% of all symptoms; 29–35% of symptoms in
the giant component). The symptom with the highest degree is
insomnia (71 connections), followed by psychomotor agitation (68),
Figure 4. The giant component and its degree distribution. In the top left and bottom right parts of the figure, node size is proportional to
the centrality of the node: the more central, the larger the node. The represented centrality measure is based on random walk betweenness [36]. That
is, we averaged the number of times that a node was part of a path between two other nodes chosen during consecutive random walks. The top left
part represents the giant component while the bottom right highlights the four most central symptoms. The top right and bottom left parts of the
figure show the fit of two functions on the degree distribution: logistic (to assess power law property; left bottom) and exponential (to assess
exponential decay; top right). The x-as represents the (log) degree while the y-axis represents the probability that a node chosen uniformly at random
has a degree larger than k.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.g004
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property of nodes that is relevant in thinking about comorbidity is
their betweenness. This measures the probability that a node lies
on a path between two other nodes. In the DSM-IV graph, the
four symptoms with the highest (random walk) betweenness are
irritable, distracted, anxious and depressed (bottom right Figure 4).
Symptoms with a high centrality may transmit the effects from
many symptoms to many other symptoms. The most central
symptoms in the DSM-IV network are rather ordinary, in the
sense that they are commonly experienced in response to a variety
of external events, such as a quarrel with a loved one or failure to
pass an exam. However, they are also likely to arise from
conditions within the DSM-network. Such diverse conditions as
alcohol addiction, lacking close friends, or amnesia, may trigger
any of these central nodes; in turn, when activated, their effects
may fan out across the network. Thus, the DSM-IV network
suggests that there are many short roads to comorbidity, and more
often than not, these run through what we may consider
‘‘mundane’’ symptoms. Interestingly, the most central symptoms
in the DSM-IV network all function as criteria for two of the
mental disorders with the highest prevalence in the US, namely
mood and anxiety disorders [24]. This is consistent with the idea
that symptom activation indeed spreads though the network
structure along the paths represented in Figure 2.
Study 2: Connecting network structure to empirical data
To the extent that the network as depicted in Figure 2
approximates the causal structure of DSM-IV symptoms ade-
quately, the small world property implies that symptom activation
will spread rapidly through the network, analogous to the way an
epidemic spreads through a population [25]. Thus, the network
model potentially explains a significant part of the substantial
comorbidity among DSM-IV categories. Further, if we make some
basic assumptions about this process, we can derive empirical
predictions from the network hypothesis at the level of the global
comorbidity structure of the DSM-IV. For instance, we may
plausibly assume that the majority of symptoms in the DSM-IV
network are positively connected; that is, having any DSM-IV
symptom results in a higher probability of developing another one.
As such, we assume that symptoms do not function as protective
factors in the development of other symptoms (i.e., resulting in a
lower probability). If this assumption is correct, we should expect
only positive empirical correlations between mental disorders (a
positive manifold). Second, we should expect an association between
distances between disorders in the network and empirical
comorbidity rates: the farther apart two disorders are, the lower
the probability of comorbidity between them.
Average shortest path lengths and comorbidity. To
examine these network predictions, we first determined the
distance between disorders in the graph. For this purpose, we
used the shortest path lengths
2 between symptoms. The distance
between two disorders was then operationalized as the average
shortest path length between their respective symptoms. The
average shortest path length between two disorders A and B is thus
equal to the expected number of edges one has to travel to reach a
randomly chosen symptom from disorder A from a randomly
chosen symptom from disorder B. The higher this number is, the
farther apart the disorders in question are situated in the network.
To relate these statistics to empirical comorbidity rates, we used
existing reports on the comorbidity structure in the National
Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R; [1,4]), in which a
sample of over 9,000 individuals completed a structured DSM
interview. In particular, we used the tetrachoric correlations
between common mental disorders as reported in Table 1 of
Krueger’s [26] analysis as our operationalization of comorbidity.
Subsequently, we related the average shortest path lengths
between disorders to the empirical comorbidity rates. Two of
the disorders discussed in [26], Substance Dependence and Substance
Abuse, are not part of the giant component; hence, we could not
include them in this analysis. However, note that although there
are no bridge symptoms that connect these disorders with, e.g.,
major depression, it is likely that causal relations between these
disorders do exist.
Figure 5 shows the empirical correlations between 28 pairs of
common DSM-IV disorders (the blue line; [26]) and the
corresponding average shortest path lengths between the symp-
toms that make up these disorders in our graph (the red line). As is
evident from the figure, the correlation between empirical
comorbidity rates and average shortest path lengths is substantially
negative (r=20.72 over all pairs of disorders; r=20.66 for pairs
of disorders that have no common symptoms). In addition,
correlations between disorders are never negative (i.e., they form a
positive manifold), consistent with the network model.
Naturally, this does not constitute proof of the model. First, the
data are consistent with our hypothesis that the causal connections
between symptoms produce the correlations in question, but we
cannot rule out the possibility that other sources of comorbidity led
to this pattern by happenstance. This is relevant because the
DSM-IV itself was constructed partly on the basis of empirical
correlations (i.e., it is likely that the scholars constructing the
various editions of the DSM used the correlations between
symptoms to construct syndromes). In addition, the disorders
themselves partly result from arbitrary or purely pragmatic
decisions. Hence the structure of the graph is unlikely to be
definitive. Finally, although common mental disorders cover a
large share of psychopathology in terms of prevalence, the number
of disorders that we could include in the analysis is limited.
Keeping in mind these caveats, however, the results could easily
have panned out differently, as there is no statistical law that
prescribes that disorders constructed in the DSM-IV fashion
should correlate positively, or that the relation between average
shortest path lengths and empirical correlations should be
negative. Thus, in our view, the results have some evidential
relevance, if only because they show that a network explanation of
the global DSM-IV comorbidity structure is feasible.
Study 3: Simulating symptom dynamics of MDE and GAD
The previous analysis shows that path lengths and empirical
comorbidity rates are correlated as would be expected if symptom
activation propagates via the network structure. However,
disorders are usually temporally dynamic, in the sense that they
are defined with respect to certain time frames (e.g., two weeks for
MDE and six months for GAD). Thus, one would ideally
demonstrate that the dynamic properties of the network can
account accurately for empirical comorbidity rates as they would
arise in time.
The network model is potentially capable of this; when coupled
with a temporal regime that specifies the causal influence of nodes
on each other, the model becomes a dynamic and intra-individual
model that describes how mental disorders and comorbidity
between them develop over time in individual persons (like the
networks for Alice and Bob in Figure 1). As such, the edges
between symptoms represent mediational processes (e.g., homeo-
static and cognitive processes) that, triggered by having symptom
A at time point 1, could result in symptom B at time point 2. For
instance, anxiety (symptom A) is likely to trigger ruminative
processes that result in depressed feelings (symptom B). Now, one
way to demonstrate the potential of the network approach to
The Small World of Psychopathology
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27407predict empirical comorbidity rates is to simulate dynamics
implied by a network for two disorders and to show that the
resulting prevalence and comorbidity rates are consistent with
their empirical counterparts. This is what we did for two disorders
with a high comorbidity rate: MDE and GAD. Figure 6 shows that
we simulated data on 14 symptoms for which comorbidity arises
only through pathways that include bridge symptoms (i.e., no core
MDE symptoms are directly connected with core GAD symptoms
and vice versa).
Simulation setup. We specified the symptom dynamics as
follows: for a given symptom in the network, the probability of
occurrence increases monotonically with the number of
neighboring symptoms that are activated. For instance, if
someone suffers from depressed mood and loss of interest, the
probability of developing thoughts of suicide is higher than for
someone who suffers from loss of interest but does not suffer from
depressed mood. The parameters of the network symptoms were
derived from an analysis of the NCS-R data. We then simulated
Figure 5. Average shortest path length and comorbidity. Left y-axis represents comorbidity; right y-axis average shortest path length.
Abbreviations: MDE=Major Depressive Episode; DYS=Dysthymia; AGPH=Agoraphobia; SOP=Social Phobia; SIP=Simple Phobia; GAD=Generalized
Anxiety Disorder; APD=Antisocial Personality Disorder.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.g005
Figure 6. The simulation of MDE and GAD and its results. The left part of the figure shows core MDE (blue nodes), core GAD (red nodes) and
bridge symptoms (purple nodes). The middle part of the figure represents the implied structure of the simulated network: comorbidity arises through
connections via bridge symptoms. There are no direct connections between core MDE and core GAD symptoms. The right part of the figure displays
the results of the simulations. The x-axis represents the number of replications of the simulation. The y-axis represents 1) odds: odds ratio of
diagnoses as measure of comorbidity, 2) alpha: Cronbach’s a,3 )MDE: prevalence of MDE and 4) GAD: prevalence of GAD.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.g006
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persons over 365 time points (‘‘days’’), allowing for the
reconstruction of yearly prevalence and comorbidity rates for
comparison against benchmark NCS-R data (which have the same
number of persons).
The simulation details are as follows. At time t, a node i has a
probability pit of turning ‘on’ (taking value 1) and of 1-pit of turning
‘off’ (taking value 0). The probability pit is determined by the logi-
stic function pit=a+(12a)[exp{biAi(t-1)2ci}/(1+exp{biAi(t-1)2ci})2a],
where Ai(t-1) is the number of neighbors of i that are activated at t-1,
bi is the sensitivity of symptom i to that activation sum, and ci is a
symptom specific threshold. We chose this probability function
because it has the plausible property of monotonicity and because it
is similar to the response function of common Item Response
Theory (IRT) models that are often used in clinical psychology [10];
hence we anticipated that this function would produce data that has
psychometrically realistic properties. In addition, the parameters of
the logistic function can be based on the analysis of available data,
which allows us to use empirical values for the network parameters.
In particular, we derived the bi and ci parameters from logistic
regression analyses executed on the NCS-R data, where (dichoto-
mous) symptom endorsement was regressed on the total number of
symptoms endorsed for the disorder in question; bi and ci are
respectively the slope and location parameters of that regression.
Finally, the parameter a controls the base rate probability that a
symptom will activate even if no neighbours are on, and the
recoveryrate probabilitythata symptomwill deactivate even ifall of
its neighbors are on. As the network architecture is derived from the
DSM-IV,and thebi and ci parametersfromtheNCS-R data,aisthe
only free parameter in the simulation. Setting a to a value of .22
produced reasonable results (this effectively corresponds to a base
rate of .05 and a recovery rate of .18) and was used in the
simulations reported. Simulation code is available from http://
www.psychosystems.org/materials.html.
After a simulated ‘‘year’’, we ‘‘diagnose’’ each network for
presence of MDE and/or GAD according to DSM-IV criteria. We
do this by examining which symptoms were present at which time
points; e.g., when a network featured activation of five out of nine
MDE symptoms for a period of at least fourteen days, and these
included at least one of the core symptoms depressed mood and loss of
interest, the network was diagnosed with MDE. For GAD, most of
the symptoms had to be present for most of the days in at least six
months (182 time points), including the core symptoms anxious,
worried about multiple events, and failure to control the worries. Finally, we
compare population statistics to those known from empirical
research. As a conservative check for specificity of the results, we
also obtained results from a random model that had the same
network architecture as the original model, but in which the pairs
of parameter values (bi,c i) from the NCS-R data were assigned
randomly to the symptoms. To check for stability of the results, we
replicated the original model and the random model simulation
1000 times each.
Simulation results. Figure 6 shows that the simulated
population of networks yielded stable and empirically plausible
results. The means for disorder prevalence over simulations are
.12 for MDE and .02 for GAD, which corresponds reasonably
with empirically established prevalence rates (around .1 for MDE
and .03 for GAD; [1,4]). Comorbidity between MDE and GAD
as assessed by the odds ratio of diagnoses is 10.08, which is
somewhat too high, but in our view still lies within the bounds of
empirical plausibility (e.g., in the NCS-R data the odds ratio lies
around 7; [27]). In a traditional psychometric analysis, the
symptoms would yield a mean(SD) Cronbach’s alpha of .78(.005)
over all symptoms, as measured at the last time point of each
simulation. We also fitted a two parameter logistic model [28],
which is known to fit the MDE symptoms [29], to 100 slices
of data, each of which represents a single timepoint in a
simulation. Although the parameter estimates for the simula-
tions are not directly comparable to those of the NCS-R data
due to the complicated structure of the NCS-R interview, the
correspondence is still reasonable; the mean(SD) correlation
between the estimated difficulty parameters in the simulation and
in the NCS data equals .70(0.01); this value is .61(.03) for the
discriminations. In all, the patterns in the simulated data do not
appear to strongly conflict with the empirical patterns we see in
the NCS data.
A noteworthy result is that GAD symptoms were, on average,
more prevalent than MDE symptoms: the lower prevalence of
GAD was solely produced by the stringent duration criterion - i.e.,
in GAD, symptoms need to be present for most days in the last six
months, whereas MDE only requires symptoms to be present for
the last two weeks. The same is true in the NCS-R data.
The question arises whether the empirical plausibility of the
results depends on the use of appropriate empirically derived
parameter values, or can be ascribed merely to the structure of the
network model (independent of its parameterization). To investi-
gate this, we compared our results to the random model
replications. To facilitate this comparison, we heuristically defined
empirically plausible ranges (see Table 2) to be in broad agreement
with the empirical literature. Table 2 shows the percentages of
original and random model replications that gave plausible results
for MDE and GAD prevalences, odds ratio, and Cronbachs alpha.
A total of 99.9% of the original model replications resulted in
overall plausible results (i.e., models which jointly satified the
empirically plausible ranges for all variables), while this was the
case for 3.2% of the random model replications. This difference
does not depend substantially on our choice of empirically
plausible ranges; this can also be seen from Figure 7, which shows
Table 2. Results of simulations.
Plausible range Mean (Sd.) % replications in plausible range
Empirical Random Original Random Original
Prevalence MDE 0.05–0.15 0.199 (0.2193) 0.119 (0.004) 27.9 100
Prevalence GAD 0.01–0.05 0.059 (0.1465) 0.024 (0.005) 19.7 100
Odds ratio 5–15 40.390 (86.933) 10.081 (1.411) 28.2 99.9
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.6–1 0.749 (0.068) 0.777 (0.005) 96 100
Overall 3.2 99.9
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027407.t002
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outcome variables.
It should be noted that the results are derived under an
extremely simple dynamical scheme. Because of this simplicity,
several properties of the simulated networks are empirically
implausible. For instance, there are no individual differences in
network parameters, while it is likely that such differences do exist
in reality. However, the points at which the model is implausible
concern overly restrictive rather than lenient aspects of the model,
and therefore work against rather than for the fit to empirical data.
For instance, if individual differences were included in the
simulations, e.g., by making network parameters random, the
model would become more flexible, making it easier to match
empirical data even better than the current model does. In fact,
that such an austere setup of the network model can come so close
to the actual data is perhaps the most unexpected and surprising
feature of this work.
Thus, although the simulated networks are incomplete and
idealized reflections of reality, the results do establish a proof of
possibility by showing that the network model can produce
empirically realistic results. Furthermore, these empirically realistic
results emerged consistently if and only if appropriate empirically
derived parameter values were used, that is, the results were
specific to the parameterized network model rather than to
network architecture alone. To the best of our knowledge, this
network model is the first dynamical model of psychopathology
that simultaneously explains population statistics regarding
prevalence, comorbidity, and internal consistency, as found in
studies like the NCS-R.
Discussion
The cause of comorbidity is a puzzle, which may have its roots
in the very conceptualization of what a mental disorder is [9,16].
Although much has been learned about the genetics, neuroscience,
and etiology of mental disorders, the past century of research also
shows that they cannot be identified with a simple set of genetic
antecedents, neural correlates, or developmental trajectories. The
network hypothesis may be considered to provide an explanation
for this situation.
First, consider genetics. Behavior genetic research has shown
that individual differences in the liability to develop disorders are,
for a large part, genetically determined (e.g., genes are estimated to
be responsible for around 50 percent of the variance in the
psychological traits considered in [30]). However, only a minor
part of the genetic variance can typically be traced to identified
polymorphisms (often less than 2 percent for psychological traits;
[31,32]). This puzzle is known as the problem of missing heritability
[33]. In the present view, it is plausible that the strength of
symptom connections in a network partly stands under genetic
control, but it is unlikely that all connections in a disorder are
affected by the same genes in all people. Instead, we may consider
the heritability of mental disorders to arise from, e.g., the genetic
transmission of intersymptom connection strength, which in turn
determines global parameters of person specific networks that
correspond to the vulnerability of the system with respect to
external and internal shocks. If this is correct, the network model
may provide an alternative explanation to missing heritability, as
compared to the currently proposed hypothesis that the heritabil-
ity of mental disorders result from very large numbers of polygenes
with small additive effects [33]. Further research should evaluate
which of these hypotheses is more plausible for which disorders.
Second, consider neuroscientific research strategies into mental
disorders. In the public eye, such studies have appeared to reveal
what, say, depression ‘‘really is’’ by linking such a disorder to, for
instance, a neurotransmitter imbalance. However, even though
neuroscientific research has provided a wealth of empirical
information about the correlates of mental disorders, no simple
identifications of disorders with neural dysfunctions have been
forthcoming. The network hypothesis suggests that this will remain
the case, because neural properties are most likely to enter the
model as mechanistic realizations of nodes and edges already in
the network, or as additional nodes and edges that extend it. Such
properties may contribute to the network structure importantly:
for instance, many of the symptoms in the DSM-IV relate to basic
homeostatic brain functions (eating, sleeping, sex, mood regula-
tion), and it is essential to investigate their precise role in sustaining
the network structure. However, just like the small world
properties of the World Wide Web do not reduce to physical
properties of individual webservers, mental disorders are unlikely
to correspond to a single, homogeneous neural substrate.
Third, consider etiology. Some researchers have proposed that a
focus on etiology may lead to a homogeneous grouping of mental
disorders. In our view, this is unlikely. The giant component in the
DSM-IV topology features 208*(208-1)/2=21,528 pairs of
symptoms. Even if we just count the number of distinct shortest
paths between any two symptoms in this topology, we obtain
129,643 distinct pathways. Although many pathways in the DSM-
IV symptom space are unlikely to be active in transmitting effects,
and it is probable that some pathways are more prevalent than
others, it would seem unlikely that a focus on etiology could bring
this number down to manageable size. Instead, the network
approach predicts that individual cases of mental disorders will be
highly idiosyncratic, both in the genetic and environmental
determinants of the disorder, as well as in the etiological pathway
by which it developed. The interesting fact is that, under the
network approach, this may be the case even though population
statistics relating to mental disorders are empirically stable. In this
sense, the network hypothesis simultaneously accommodates the
stability of population statistics in this area of research, and the
idiosyncratic unpredictability of the individual person.
Thus, the network model not only yields plausible explanations
for characteristic patterns in empirical psychopathology data, as
shown in the research reported here; it may also illuminate the
limited successes of research paths that have so far been taken. In
particular, if mental disorders correspond to networks of causally
coupled variables, we should not expect them to conform to a
homogeneous biological, genetic, or etiological analysis. Instead,
similar to current systems approaches in biology [34], research
into psychopathology may profitably adopt a psychosystems approach
by investigating the inherent complexity of mental disorders [35]
through explicit models of the interplay between their psycholog-
ical, biological, and social features that play a role in the
development of psychiatric conditions, understood as clusters of
causally linked properties [37,38].
Further research in this direction may be pursued along the
following lines. First, it is important to augment the network
structure with ‘‘positive’’ nodes, that is, with nodes that are known
to act as protective factors against developing pathologies (e.g.,
coping mechanisms used to ‘‘ward off’’ symptoms, or situational
factors that may protect certain symptoms from rising to the level
of pathology). This requires the construction of an ‘‘inverse’’
DSM, i.e., a categorized list of anti-symptoms that protect against
disorders by blocking the spreading of problems through the
network. Second, research into the direction and nature of the
causal effects between network nodes (i.e., symptoms and anti-
symptoms) should lead to a more refined representation of the
network structure. Third, it is of interest to investigate how
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higher-order factors like internalizing and externalizing [26],
relate to network structures. In traditional models, these factors are
most readily interpreted as latent common causes of the item
responses [10,39,40], but in the network models considered here,
such common causes are lacking. Our expectation is that the
relevant factors can be viewed as approximately isomorphic to
regions of strongly connected symptoms, but whether this is
conceptually and mathematically tenable is a question for further
research. Fourth, it is important to test the dynamics of the
network model against real data. Experience sampling studies, or
other ways to track symptom dynamics, would appear to be
especially suited for this purpose. Such research could also begin to
unravel intra- and interindividual differences in network structure,
which would open the possibility to examine salient network
characteristics of individuals known to be at risk for developing
mental disorders. If such characteristics could be charted, specific
targeting of the most important network components (either with
medication or with psychotherapy) might offer a novel way to
develop therapeutic interventions and monitor their effects.
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